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THE BRAZILIAN LABOUR MARKET IN THE 
1990s 
By Leonardo Trevisan 
Introduction 
The concept of a formal monthly-waged job has been under threat recently in 
Brazil. Between the 1940s and the 1980s the south-east sector of the country 
achieved considerable levels of industrialisation, so that there was a significant 
increase in formal, legally registered jobs. In 1940 for every ten workers with a 
formal wage, only three had legal registration. However, in the late 1980s the 
Brazilian labour market began to change. Between 1989 and 1995, only two out 
of ten new workers were in occupations with a formal wage and legal 
registration. Of the remaining eight, five were self-employed workers and the 
last three were not formal wage earners. All these figures confirm that, between 
1989 and 1995, formal and legitimate employment decreased dramatically, 
while informal occupations increased, thus avoiding a rise in unemployment.1 
The changes in the Brazilian labour market began before the Constitutional 
Assembly in 1988, but undoubtedly these changes accelerated after the new 
Constitution was adopted. Between 1989 and 1995, the number of formal and 
legal jobs experienced a continuous negative rate of growth. In this six-year 
period, the number of unregistered jobs grew at a rate of 541,000 per year, 
while in the same period 351,000 legally registered, formal jobs were lost 
annually. 
These figures serve to highlight an important trend. According to the 1996 
Census of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), the 
geographical and sectoral distribution of new jobs is a fundamental feature of 
the current Brazilian labour market. In the formal labour market the most 
notable tendency has been the transfer of industrial workers to the service 
sectors. The IBGE data record that in the 1990 Census industrial workers 
constituted 15.2 per cent of formal jobs. In 1996 this had fallen to 12.3 per cent. 
Meanwhile, according to the 1990 IBGE Census, 17.9 per cent of formal jobs 
were in the service sector; in 1996 this increased to 19.1 per cent of the regular 
workforce.2 
The existence of sectoral transfers does not ensure stability in the formal 
labour market. There was no automatic transfer from the industrial to the 
The author would like to thank Leonardo Campos Filho for his suggestions on the 
bibliography. 
1 Pochman, M. (1997) Employment in Brazil (Centro de Estudos Sindicais e de Economia do 
Trabalho, Campinas: Instituto de Economia/Unicamp). 
2 IBGE Census of 1996 (Rio de Janeiro). 
service sector. Furthermore, the service sector experienced a significant 
statistical problem, since the IBGE data had not fully absorbed the effects of the 
dramatic downsizing on the principal formal employer of the service sector: the 
financial system. Brazilian banks dismissed 78,446 employees between June 
1995 and June 1996 (the last month that the IBGE collected data for the 
Census). According to the bank employees' union, dismissals within the sector 
accelerated between June and December 1996, affecting more than 120,000 
bank employees.3 
The geographical concentration of job losses in Brazil has been as 
significant as the sectoral loss of formal jobs. The past six years have witnessed 
the loss of 56.1 per cent of formal jobs within the nine principal Brazilian 
metropolitan regions. In Sao Paulo, the largest metropolitan region in the 
country, 30.2 per cent of the total formal jobs disappeared. It must be 
remembered that the Greater Sao Paulo region incorporates 10.8 per cent of the 
total Brazilian population. Indeed, this new employment situation has redrawn 
the Brazilian job map. 
Essentially, the most important data in the 1996 Census is that concerning 
the social benefits connected to formal jobs. According to the 1990 IBGE 
Census, 50.1 per cent of those holding formal wage occupations had paid into 
the Instituto Nacional de Seguridade Social (INSS); in 1996 the IBGE reported 
that only 43.1 per cent of the Brazilian population who had jobs formally paid 
into the INSS. In 1996, the economically active Brazilian population stood at 
74,138,441 people. This figure represents an increase of 9,670,460 since the 
previous Census in 1990. Within six years almost ten million new workers were 
competing for jobs in a labour market that had lost over 500,000 formal jobs per 
year.4 Only the informal economy could absorb the millions of workers looking 
for jobs. 
The increase in the informal economy has profoundly altered the labour 
market. In contrast to other industrialised economies, Brazil does not have a 
strong programme to protect, with appropriate social benefits, those who work 
in the informal economy. Indeed, as the IBGE figures confirm, Brazil has made 
flexible the laws that traditionally protected the labour market. This 'disguised 
flexibilisation' has had serious effects on the Brazilian labour market. 
The Formal Sector Job Market 
Companies under pressure to compete efficiently in an open market have tended 
to transfer this pressure to their employees. It has been a natural movement 
driven by the law of survival of the fittest. However, in the Brazilian economy 
this 'transfer of pressure' has occurred at a time when the economic frontiers 
3 S3o Paulo bank workers' union figures published in O Estado de Sao Paulo, 2 Sept. 1997. 
4 Figures from IBGE Census of 1996 (Rio de Janeiro). 
have been opened to international competition and the rate of exchange has 
made it difficult to increase the volume of exported products. The employers 
have felt the strain and they have had to learn the 'new rules of the game'. As a 
result, unemployment has increased as well as productivity. The reason for this 
is not easily explained. However, formal employment, inclusive of social 
benefits, has been seen as a 'privilege'. So in this situation every effort has been 
made to keep this 'privilege'. In the first place this has meant the increased use 
of'overtime'.5 
Between 1985 and 1995 the legal working week fell from 46 to 43 hours. 
According to the Departamento Intersindical de Estatisticas e Estudos Socio-
economics (DIEESE), the number of employees working longer hours than the 
legal working week increased from 22.4 per cent to 42.5 per cent during this 
same period.6 For example, in 1995, according to the Metalworkers' Union of 
Guarulhos (an industrial city in the Greater Sao Paulo region), 61 per cent of 
employees worked overtime. Furthermore, 33 per cent worked over 50 hours 
per week. The union confirmed that, in 1995, the average metal worker in 
Guarulhos worked between 42 and 51 hours per week.7 
Working conditions varied greatly in different sectors. In the same period, 
according to the DIEESE, the formal working week in the retail sector fell from 
50 to 46 hours, but the percentage of workers doing overtime rose from 41.8 per 
cent in 1985 to 55.1 per cent in 1995. The same trend is apparent in the service 
sector: between 1985 and 1996 the working week fell from 43 to 41 hours; 
nevertheless, in 1985 23.8 per cent of the employees were working overtime. 
The conclusion of the DIEESE study points to the principal reason for this 
increase in overtime: without the prospect of a sustainable increase in economic 
activity, companies preferred paying for overtime work instead of hiring new 
employees. The DIEESE study concluded that the level of production had been 
easily controlled by these overtime policies. Employers were more willing in 
some cases to pay double wages than to hire new employees. Employers 
consider the cost of dismissal excessively high. The DIEESE study did not 
address this point, but the rights of workers included in the 1988 Constitution 
have undoubtedly worried employers. 
The question of improved productivity runs deeper than the mere cost of 
5 In 1996, research from the C o n f e d e r a l Nacional da Industria (CNI), the principal Brazilian 
employer in the industrial sector, showed that employees were willing to take on more work, if the 
job carried guarantees. This research, carried out at a national level, showed that 72% of workers 
agreed to more hours/work in exchange for their continued employment and 62% agreed to a 
reduction in their vacation allowance. However, 78% of industrial workers opposed salary cuts 
even in return for job security and 66% rejected cuts in social benefits under the same conditions. 
These cuts were seen as unacceptable in a country in which salaries are already low and social 
benefits minimal. Full research results were published in O Globo, 3 July 1996. 
6 Figures from Anuario do Trabalhador 96/97 (Sao Paulo: DIEESE, 1996). 
7 Research from Metalworkers' Union of Guarulhos, Aruja, Mairipora and Santa Izabel 
published in O Estado de Sao Paulo, 2 March 1997. 
dismissal or a simple control of production using overtime. The industrial 
relations theory underpinning this perspective does not take into account the 
direction and the demands of the new economic situation. The method of 
increasing productivity by placing damaging pressure on the workforce is a 
short-term vision. Such behaviour is typical of sectors (or segments of sectors) 
that are resistant to the acceptance of new economic conditions. The DIEESE 
studies have noted the rise in productivity in different industrial sectors, without 
questioning the reasons for this higher level of productivity - whether through 
investment in research and development, retraining workers, or merely through 
exploitation of the workforce. 
Unemployment has risen alongside productivity. The best example is found 
in the automobile industry. In July 1996 this sector sold 26 per cent more than 
in July 1995. However, in July 1996 the automobile companies had 114,100 
employees, 10,400 less than in July 1995.8 There are two possible explanations 
for this situation: new techniques of production or merely new work methods 
causing continuous job losses. 
There now appears to be a big difference between the Brazilian economy's 
capacity to create jobs and the number of new job seekers in the Brazilian 
labour market. The 1996 IBGE Census showed this difference to be 
considerable. While the economy was growing between 1995 and 1996, job 
offers increased by 1.7 per cent. However, the economically active population 
(people in work or those seeking it) rose by 3.1 per cent in the same period. 
Another important 1996 Census finding is the fact that in June 1996 the number 
of formal jobs with legal registration had fallen by 9.1 per cent in comparison 
with June 1995. 
The second feature of the Brazilian economy concerns the salaries of formal 
sector workers. The C o n f e d e r a l Nacional da Industria (CNI) conducts 
monthly research on wage levels and in 1996 revealed two important findings: 
- the total of the net wages paid in 1996 for formal jobs was 3.55 per cent 
less than in 1995 
- the real average wage paid in 1996 had risen by 6.1 per cent in comparison 
with 1995.9 
This figure, published by a respected employers' organisation, has 
confirmed a serious tendency in the Brazilian labour market. The average wage 
rose because the number of workers has been declining for the last five years. 
The total number of salaries was lower but, when this total was shared between 
fewer people, the average increased. The workers who keep their jobs need to 
work harder and longer hours than the previous year. 
8 Figures for automobile sector performance were published in O Estado de Sao Paulo, 11 Aug. 
1996. 
9 Monthly Research, CNI, Aug. 1996. 
Workers with specialised skills kept their jobs and their hours increased. 
During the last annual wage campaign, the Sindicato dos Metalurgicos de Sao 
Paulo (the largest and strongest union of the Brazilian industrial sector) claimed 
'nowadays it is common for employees to operate five different machines by 
themselves'. The union also claimed 'they (the Sao Paulo metalworks 
employees) do everything, even clean the machines and the ground where they 
work'.10 
The IBGE Census figures provide important information on the new 
Brazilian labour market. Between 1990 and 1996, formal sector jobs fell by 
34.2 per cent. The same IBGE figures show that Brazil's economically active 
population had risen by 8.7 per cent in the same period - a real difference of 
almost ten million people. Despite this, unemployment in Brazil has been low, 
even in comparison with other industrialised countries. Between 1990 and 1996 
the average unemployment rate was 5.3 per cent. According to the IBGE 
Monthly Research in July 1997, this rate had remained at practically the same 
level: 5.91 per cent. Clearly, it was only the expansion of the informal economy 
that prevented any real rise in unemployment. There have been profound 
changes in the labour market and these provide the first explanation for these 
low unemployment rates. 
As in other countries, the definition of unemployment in Brazil is widely 
debated. The first problem is that there are several unemployment rates, all of 
which are calculated using different methodologies. Brazil does not have a 
national unemployment rate covering the 27 states of the Brazilian federation. 
Unemployment rates are only recorded for some regions. Figures from the 
Ministerio do Trabalho (Ministry of Labour) record the gains and losses of jobs 
within the formal economy. Brazil has 1.5 million registered companies, but 
only 374,000 reported hiring or dismissal of workers.11 In 1997, the Ministry of 
Labour and the Ministry of Finance began a special programme to cross-
reference fiscal and social information files from the Relacao Anual de 
Informacoes Sociais (RAIS), giving a range of social information that each firm 
is obliged to provide to the Ministry of Labour annually. 
In calculating unemployment rates, the IBGE considered only the six 
principal Brazilian metropolitan regions, including the informal economy but 
with a narrow definition of 'length of unemployment'. The IBGE complies 
with all the rules of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and defines an 
unemployed person as someone who is not actively working, which normally 
has been known as 'open unemployment'. The DIEESE, by contrast, has only 
completed data collection on the Greater Sao Paulo region. However, the 
DIEESE approach to the calculation of the unemployment figures includes all 
those over ten years old, if the person has already worked or is just looking for a 
10 Comments published in O Estado de Sao Paulo, 18 Nov. 1996. 
11 According to Daniel Oliveira, deputy-secretary of the Department of Employment and Salary 
Policy in the Ministry of Labour: 'figures from the Ministry of Labour cover around 80% of formal 
employment', interview published in Folha de Sao Paulo, 26 Oct. 1997. 
job. The DIEESE applies two definitions, 'open unemployment' and 'hidden 
unemployment' which includes those who have had some paid work in the last 
30 days but without regularity. Using these different methods, in August 1997 
the IBGE declared that 6.4 per cent of the economically active population was 
unemployed, the Ministry of Labour claimed an unemployment rate of 5.7 per 
cent and the DIEESE stated that the unemployment rate of Greater Sao Paulo 
was 15.7 per cent. 
A Demographic Approach to Unemployment 
The different factors behind low unemployment rates have been the topic of 
heated debates. Research by the Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas e Aplicadas 
(IPEA), based on Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego do IBGE, contributed a new 
and important perspective to this debate. These figures highlighted the 
significant reduction in youth employment in the Brazilian labour market. 
According to IBGE/IPEA data, in 1991 the participation of children and 
teenagers (up to 14 years of age) in the labour market reached 7.01 per cent. In 
1995 their participation had fallen to 4.5 per cent. The reduction in employment 
of 15-17 year olds has been even more striking. In the 1990 Census 41.9 per 
cent of youngsters in that age range were employed; yet in 1995 this fell to just 
31.7 per cent. For 18 to 24 year olds, participation in the labour market also fell, 
from 78.8 per cent in 1990 to 72.07 per cent in 1995.12 IPEA data can be used to 
show how the Brazilian labour market is distributed among ages as Table 1 
shows: 
Table 1 
Participation in the Labour Market - Percentage by Age 
(Average percentage per year) 
1991 7.01 39.21 76.89 96.89 n.a. 82.28 58.46 36.60 14.13 
1992 5.69 35.12 74.18 94.50 97.29 80.36 57.03 35.70 13.34 
1993 5.22 32.49 72.93 93.84 96.72 79.55 56.23 34.05 12.55 
1994 5.19 31.94 72.57 94.55 97.11 80.94 56.87 32.21 12.18 
1995 4.56 31.07 72.07 94.95 96.96 81.22 57.31 33.02 12.65 
Source: IPEA, Boletim de Acompanhamento Conjuntural do Mercado de Trabalho, 1996 
n.a. - not available 
The abundance of young people within the Brazilian population has had 
numerous implications. The unemployment rates have been kept low due to the 
12 Figures from Boletim de Acompanhamento Conjuntural do Mercado de Trabalho (Brasilia: 
IPEA, April 1996). 
Y e a r U p to 14 15 to 17 18 to 24 25 to 30 to 40 to 50 to 59 60 to 64 65 Y e a r s 
y e a r s y e a r s >ea r s 29 39 49 y e a r s y e a r s o r o v e r 
\ e a r s >ea r s \ e a r s 
reduction of youth employment. Figures from the past six years show evidence 
of almost continuous levels of employment except among young employees. 
Clearly, young people had left the positions that they previously occupied in the 
labour market and these same youngsters have been registered, statistically, as 
students. In the long term this will probably produce a better-educated Brazilian 
workforce. For the present, as the IBGE figures confirmed through the IPEA 
study, defining young workers as students results in a low unemployment rate. 
This contributes to a sociological phenomenon termed 'first job delay', and 
statistics have confirmed a generalised occurrence of this phenomenon in the 
Brazilian labour market. 
Another fundamental factor in the low unemployment rate is connected to 
the amount of hiring activity in comparison with dismissals. According to 
Cadastro Geral de Empregados e Desempregados do Ministerio do Trabalho, 
1991 and 1992 were two peak years for dismissals, totalling 580,000 and 
602,000 respectively. However, between 1993 and 1995 the number of 
dismissals stabilised. The Ministry of Labour study showed that hiring had 
become extremely selective, but the number of dismissals was also low. 
This hiring pattern demonstrates a new profile in the Brazilian workforce. 
According to Ministry of Labour data, new male employees were on average 
1.6 years younger and paid salaries 18 per cent lower than dismissed workers. 
The new female employees were 1.8 years younger and paid salaries 10 per cent 
lower than their dismissed counterparts. The difference between the new male 
and female employees increases when education is also factored into the 
equation. While the dismissed male and the new male employees had basically 
the same level of schooling (approximately six years), the new female 
employees had one year of schooling more than their dismissed counterparts. 
The data also shows that female workers in the Brazilian workforce had on 
average completed eight years of schooling, two years more than the average 
for males.13 
A direct female presence on the production line represents an important 
social opportunity and contributes to the evolution of the Brazilian workforce. 
Since the early 1980s, IBGE data have recorded the consequences of such 
changes. They point to the fact that as the years of schooling rise in the 
workforce due to this female presence, the average age of Brazilian workers has 
fallen, due to the lower average age of female employees.14 
Obviously, low national rates of unemployment did not rule out high 
unemployment in certain sectors of the workforce. The above mentioned study 
by IPEA demonstrates an impressive array of different dismissal rates since 
1993. Some graduate professions recorded significant losses, for example 
economists (7,000 between 1993 and 1995), engineers and architects. Between 
11 Figures from Cadastro Geral de Empregados e Desempregados do Ministerio do Trabalho 
(Brasilia: Ministerio do Trabalho, 1997). 
14 Censo Industrial de 1985 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE). 
1993 and 1996, 32,000 managers lost their jobs. The number of managers 
losing their jobs was practically identical to the number of dismissed workers 
without specific skills or graduate study. 
The New Job Map 
The past six years confirm that in national terms there is a stabilising tendency 
within the Brazilian labour market, as the IBGE figures have shown. However, 
this disguises important differences between metropolitan areas, Brasilia and the 
Atlantic coast. Metropolitan area unemployment has its own features 
demanding specific analysis. Industrial concentration is a primary feature, with 
a number of very serious social consequences. 
The 1996 IBGE figures showed that the national average for industrial 
production rose 10 per cent between 1994 and 1996. However, while output in 
Santa Catarina (in the south) increased 16 per cent per year and in Minas Gerais 
(south-east) 13.7 per cent per year, in Sao Paulo, a traditionally industrial state, 
output rose only 7.7 per cent and in Rio Grande do Sul, another traditionally 
industrial state, production hardly increased at all. 
Figures on job creation show that Minas Gerais led the demand for labour in 
1996, when the state created 61,778 new jobs while Sao Paulo shed 55,000 jobs 
in the industrial sector. This maintained the pattern set in 1995 when Minas 
Gerais had created 28,000 new jobs and 48,000 workers in the Sao Paulo 
industrial sector were dismissed. 
These consequences need to be carefully analysed. For example, Ministry of 
Labour figures show that in Sao Paulo the average salary was R$504 per month 
(roughly US$450 at the 1998 exchange rate); meanwhile in Minas Gerais the 
average salary was R$269 (US$233). Besides such salary advantages, Minas 
Gerais enjoyed a fiscal advantage; in Sao Paulo the Imposto sobre Circulasao de 
Mercadorias (ICMS), similar to the Value Added Tax (VAT), was maintained at 
18 per cent while the same tax in Minas Gerais was cut to 12 per cent. 
Fiscal concessions have been introduced by other Brazilian states in order to 
attract investors. Ceara in the north-east provides a good example. Besides the 
reduction of ICMS to 12 per cent as in other states, the Ceara government 
offered a subsidised loan to manufacturing companies that located in the state. 
The effort to attract investors was very successful. Between 1990 and 1996, 
Ceara had 366 new industrial projects creating 77,341 new jobs. During this 
period, according to the IBGE, total investment in Ceara reached R$4.6 billion 
(US$4.2 billion). 
However, the reduction of ICMS had serious consequences. There was a 
reduction in the national participation of tax revenue from states that had 
offered strong tax incentives. For example, Minas Gerais in 1990 contributed 
10.4 per cent of the national ICMS revenue. In 1996, with thousands of new 
industrial jobs created, this rate had fallen to 9.7 per cent. According to IBGE 
figures, the results were the same for other states that reduced their tax rates. 
There has been a significant shift in resources between different Brazilian 
economic regions and specific states as a result of these new investments. Table 
2 shows regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with each state's evolution 
since 1970: 
Table 2 - Regional G D P 
States G D P Participation in Total Brazilian GDP 
(Percentage per year) 
North (total) 2.2 3.5 4.9 South-east (total) 65.2 62.1 57.2 
Rondonia 0.1 0.3 0.6 Minas Gerais 8.4 9.6 9.3 
Acre 0.1 0.1 0.2 Espirito Santo 1.2 1.5 1.6 
Amazonas 0.8 1.2 1.3 Rio de Janeiro 16.1 13.2 10.5 
Roraima 0.0 0.0 2.2 Sao Paulo 39.5 37.8 35.8 
Tocantins 0.0 0.2 0.1 
South (total) 17.0 17.4 17.4 
North-east (total) 12.0 12.2 13.7 Paran£ 5.5 6.5 6.6 
Maranhao 0.9 0.9 1.1 Santa Catarina 2.8 2.9 3.4 
Piaui 0.4 0.4 0.5 Rio Grande do Sul 8.7 8.0 7.3 
Ceara 1.5 1.5 1.6 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.6 0.6 0.9 Centre-west(total) 3.6 4.8 6.9 
Paraiba 0.7 0.7 0.8 Mato Grosso do Sul 0 0.6 1.3 
Pernambuco 3.0 2.6 2.5 Mato Grosso 1.1 1.1 1.0 
Alagoas 0.7 0.7 0.8 Goias 1.6 1.7 2.2 
Sergipe 0.4 0.4 0.7 Distrito Federal 0.9 1.4 2.3 
Bahia 3.8 4.4 4.6 
BRAZIL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Considera, C. (1997) IPEA, Pesquisas sobre PIBs Estaduais 
One of the most striking features of Table 2 is the decline in importance of 
Sao Paulo. Investors deciding to leave S£o Paulo and invest in other Brazilian 
states had to consider three different factors: access to a consumer market, the 
level of training in the workforce (for example, Minas Gerais has industrial 
workers with an average schooling level higher than that of Sao Paulo) and the 
quality of the transport system and energy supply. Different states in Brazil 
have improved these conditions for investors and have also promoted the idea 
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of a labour movement that does not make great demands.15 
According to the IBGE Census, between 1994 and 1996 (the last national 
data available) Sao Paulo still attracted 29.6 per cent of total investment. In 
second place was Minas Gerais with 19.8 per cent of the total, followed by 
Parana at 10.1 per cent and Rio de Janeiro with 8.5 per cent. However, in Sao 
Paulo investment has been shifting geographically towards the centre of the 
state. That is an important point in the new Brazilian job map. As with other 
metropolitan areas, the city of Sao Paulo no longer attracts industrial 
investment. As in other industrialised countries, changes within the Brazilian 
job map have meant that industrial investment has been moving out of the 
metropolitan areas.16 
According to the 1996 IBGE Census, the unemployment rate in the six 
Brazilian greater metropolitan areas was double the national average as a 
consequence of this loss of industrial investment. There are several possible 
explanations for this rise in the metropolitan unemployment rate, but the most 
significant has been the ^industrialisation' process. The cities of Porto Alegre, 
Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro recorded unemployment rates of 
over 14 per cent in 1996. Salvador and Recife, capitals of the north-eastern 
states of Bahia and Pernambuco respectively, recorded unemployment rates of 
13.6 per cent in 1996. It is important to note that the large-scale industrial 
investment in Minas Gerais did not reach Belo Horizonte, the state capital. 
Unemployment rates in Belo Horizonte were higher than in other capitals in the 
south-east.17 
The concept of unemployment in metropolitan areas entails two different 
criteria: 'open' and 'hidden' unemployment. The first criterion refers to 
absolute unemployment without any possibility of work. The second criterion 
includes disguised unemployment including all the features covered by the 
informal economy and very low quality jobs. According to the 1996 IBGE 
Census, 47 per cent of the economically active population operate at least in 
part in the informal economy. 
These figures have generated heated debate as mentioned earlier. The 
15 For example, Black & Decker closed a factory in S3o Paulo and built a new one in Uberaba, 
Minas Gerais state. Claudio Miers, Human Resources Director of the company, said that he had 
reached a special agreement with the local union for a new manufacturing plant in Uberaba, which 
he had been unable to achieve in S3o Paulo. Interview published in Gazeta Mercantile 2 Sept. 
1997. 
16 According to Ministry of Labour figures, in 1996 the six principal metropolitan areas were 
responsible for only 30,512 of the 318,422 new formal sector jobs created in Brazil; Cadastro 
Geral de Empregados e Desempregados do Ministerio do Trabalho (Brasilia: Minist6rio do 
Trabalho, 1997). 
17 According to Economic Monthly Research of the Funda93o Jo3o Pinheiro, in July 1997 the 
economically active population in Belo Horizonte stood at 1,753,876 people, of which 238,789 
were unemployed. According to Ministry of Labour figures, between January and August 1997, 
71,816 formal jobs had been created in Minas Gerais; 55,240 of these jobs were in the interior of 
the state with only 16,576 in the Belo Horizonte metropolitan area. 
metropolitan areas offer huge possibilities for informal employment, providing 
an escape valve for those hit by unemployment. However, there has recently 
been a limit on the growth of informal sector employment opportunities. 
Furthermore, the Brazilian privatisation process is not yet complete. When that 
happens, it will lead to dramatic changes in formal job structure and the formal 
unemployment rate. Last, but not least, when the Administrative Reform of the 
State in Brazil is finally passed in Congress, municipal government will no 
longer be the largest employer. When the Administrative Reform permits 
dismissal of public servants - due to the poor financial health of bankrupted 
councils - the Brazilian unemployment rate will no doubt be much higher.18 
The New Employment Profile 
The new geographical distribution of jobs has led to rethinking regarding 
employment in the Brazilian labour market. First of all, the new employment 
pattern has created another kind of excluded worker in the formal workforce. In 
1985, DIEESE research showed that 30.2 per cent of male workers with eight 
years experience were unemployed in the Greater Sao Paulo area. In 1995, 43 
per cent of the male workers with the same characteristics were unemployed in 
the same metropolitan area. All of them were over 40 years old.19 According to 
the IBGE, male unemployment figures at the national level have risen at a 
similar rate. The national unemployment rate among males between the age of 
40 and 49 reached 15.9 per cent in the 1996 Census, roughly three times the 
national average of 5.7 per cent. This confirms that the dismissal process hit 
those with higher salaries on the production line first, discriminating against 
male workers with a slower capacity to adapt to new work methods. 
The search for a new job in Sao Paulo required an average of 20 weeks, 
according to 1996 data from the Fundagao Sistema Estadual de Analise de 
Datos (SEADE). However, when this search was conducted by those aged 40 
and above, the 'waiting season' rose to an average of 26 weeks. According to 
the same research conducted in 1995, these male job seekers were waiting an 
average 24 weeks before finding a new job. In 1993, 40 to 49 year old 
unemployed males waited an average 16 weeks before securing a new 
position.20 There has obviously been a constant squeeze on the possibilities for 
unskilled workers in the Brazilian labour market. 
However, this 'squeeze' raises other questions. A serious decline has been 
18 An economic projection elaborated by Professor Siegfred Bender of the Funda<?3o Instituto de 
Pesquisas Economicas of the Universidade de S3o Paulo (FIPE), confirmed: if and when the Social 
Insurance Reform has been concluded, the Brazilian Gross National Product will increase by 1.8%; 
with the Fiscal Reform 1.5% and with the Administrative Reform, 0.4%. According to Bender's 
calculations, a 20% reduction in public servant expenditure would allow R$5.5 billion (roughly 
USS5 billion) in new state investments. The Siegfred Bender interview was published in O Estado 
de Sao Paulo, 2 Nov. 1997. 
19 Figures from Anuario do Trabalhador 96/97 (S3o Paulo: DIEESE, 1997). 
20 Figures from Pesquisa de Emprego e Desemprego (S3o Paulo: SEADE, 1996). 
recorded in employment in the industrial sector, which in Brazil offers better 
job quality than any other. According to IBGE data, in 1995 industrial jobs had 
decreased 17.8 per cent in comparison to 1985, and 35 per cent in comparison 
to 1989. Each industrial job lost contributed to the overall deterioration of 
average job quality in Brazil. 
According to IBGE figures, the service sector comprised 45.8 per cent of 
total jobs in 1986, rising to 54.3 per cent in 1995. The increase in service sector 
jobs contributes to the general problem of job quality. Job quality in the service 
sector is more precarious than in the industrial sector. This is confirmed by the 
rate of workforce rotation in different sectors of the Brazilian economy. 
According to 1995 Ministry of Labour figures, 47 per cent of workers in the 
industrial sector worked less than two years in the same company. In the service 
sector this rose to 61 per cent and in the building sector it reached 80 per cent. 
Jobs in the industrial sector in Brazil may have been hard to come by, yet they 
remain of higher quality than any other.21 
Among 12 industrialised countries (see Table 3) Brazil has the highest rate 
of workforce rotation, although it is important to note the next highest is found 
in the United States: 
Table 3 
Labour Turnover 
Average percentage of workers with less than two years in the same company 
Source: Gonzaga, Gustavo (1996) Emprego no Brasil; um Problema de Baixa Produtividade, Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil Research. 
Obviously, lower job quality has a significant influence on Brazil's capacity 
to compete. An interesting research paper, published by a Brazilian investment 
bank, analyses the question of jobs in Brazil as a problem of 'low productivity'. 
21 Figures from Cadastro Geral de Empregados e Desempregados (Brasilia: Minist^rio do 
Trabalho, 1997). 
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This study, written by Gustavo Gonzaga, a lecturer in the Economics 
Department of the Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro, argued 
that the real issue in Brazil has been job quality, not quantity, connected to the 
low productivity of the Brazilian workforce. The Brazilian economy has been 
able to sustain a 25.6 per cent increase in jobs between 1986 and 1995. In the 
same period, the number of economically active members of the Brazilian 
population rose from 56.8 million to 74.1 million, a similar increase to the 
number of jobs created, so that the rate of 'open' unemployment rose only 
modestly.22 
In the same period (1986-95) each of the industrialised economies have 
faced higher rates of unemployment - apart from the United States - with 
serious social consequences. According to Gonzaga, between 1986 and 1995 
the ability of the Brazilian economy to create so many new jobs was due to the 
poor quality of such jobs, resulting in low productivity and low salaries. The 
study points to a decrease in net salaries in metropolitan areas and an 
insignificant increase of 0.6 per cent in formal jobs, although the percentage of 
jobs (formal and informal sectors) rose by 25.6 per cent in the same period, as 
already stated. 
Low wages have been the norm in Brazilian economic history. In contrast, 
the CNI figures reveal that the real average wage increased 6.1 per cent between 
June 1995 and June 1996. A detailed analysis of Ministry of Labour figures 
supports the inferences made in the Gonzaga paper regarding the new 
employment profile in Brazil. Using this data the Brazilian newspaper Folha de 
Sao Paulo calculated the structure of jobs and job losses by salary in Greater 
Sao Paulo (see Table 4): 
Table 4 
Formal Jobs in Greater Sao Paulo - by salary level 
Half to 1 salary 43,339 6,908 + 16% 
1 to 1.5 salary 58,911 8,631 + 15% 
1.5 to 2 salaries 94,726 29,048 + 31% 
2 to 3 salaries 530,240 51,455 + 10% 
3 to 5 salaries 678,881 -45,490 -7% 
5 salaries 320,008 -38,742 - 12% 
Unknown 192,188 -4,893 -4% 
Total 2,918,293 -113,082 -4% 
Source: RAIS/1994, arrangement by model 1 from Cadastro Geral de Empregados 
e Desempregados do Ministerio do Trabalho, 1995/96. 
Published in Folha de Sao Paulo, 22 June 1997. 
22 Gonzaga, Gustavo (1996), Emprego no Brasil: um Problema de Baixa Produtividade (Rio de 
Janeiro: Brazil Research). 
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Training - Great Hopes and Worrying Failures 
In 1996, the economically active population in Brazil stood at approximately 75 
million people. According to IBGE figures, the average level of schooling 
amongst this population was 5.5 years. According to the DIEESE, 62 per cent 
of the metalworkers in Guarulhos had not completed a professional course 
before or during their employment.23 Meanwhile, according to the Piano 
Nacional de Educacao Profissional (PLANFOR), developed by the Ministry of 
Labour, only 5.5 per cent of the economically active population had access to 
professional training. 
PLANFOR has very ambitious goals. Based on the 1996 figures, the 
Brazilian Ministry of Labour intended to train 1.5 million workers in 1997. In 
1998 the objective is to train 2.5 million with the eventual goal of reaching 15 
million Brazilian workers. This figure is equivalent to 20 per cent of the 
Brazilian workforce. 
The Brazilian government has made a major financial investment in 
PLANFOR. In 1996 it spent R$232 million (US$209 million), in 1997 R$320 
million (US$288 million), and the predicted spending for 1998 is R$260 million 
(US$234 million). Officially, PLANFOR attends to the needs of the long-term 
unemployed; those who are directly threatened with dismissal by the production 
re-structuring process; and workers in the informal economic sector.24 
PLANFOR's projections have been unrealistic. It is funded by the Fundo de 
Amparo do Trabalhador (paid by workers) and all the training courses have 
union support. However, the training in which they invest does not always 
provide appropriate results. The best results have been achieved with 
metalworkers; according to the C o n f e d e r a l Nacional dos Metalurgicos 
(CNM), approximately 50 per cent of the workers retrained by PLANFOR have 
obtained new positions. 
Determining what is the criterion for the term 'new job' has been a real 
problem. The CNM has considered a job in commerce, or any position in the 
building sector as a 'new job' for individuals employed as skilled metalworkers 
prior to their dismissal. There have been new positions, but in reality only 18 
per cent of retrained metalworkers regained formal jobs in the industrial sector 
with a similar quality job to the one they held before dismissal and retraining.25 
Bank unions, having more rigid definitions of what constitutes a 'new job', 
recorded that 16 per cent of workers had obtained a new job after taking the 
23 Research from Metalworkers' Union of Guarulhos, Aruja, Mairipora and Santa Izabel 
published in O Estado de Sao Paulo, 2 March 1997. 
24 Figures from Piano Nacional de Educagao Profissional-1996/97 (Brasilia: Minist6rio do 
Trabalho, 1997). 
25 Figures from Confedera^o Nacional dos Metalurgicos, Programa Integral de Qualificagao e 
Requalificagao para o Trabalho (S3o Paulo: CNM/CUT, 1997). 
PLANFOR course.26 
In Brazil 'training' has been highlighted as a priority for unemployed 
workers. Indeed, training workers has constituted a huge problem for the 
Brazilian workforce in all sectors, including those with highly specialised jobs. 
This situation has been explained first by a low capacity to adapt to new work 
methods due to very low levels of formal schooling. Secondly, Brazilian 
institutions undertaking the task of training people have exclusively addressed 
their aims at preparing a specific number of workers, sometimes according to 
immediate industry or sector necessities.27 During the past five decades, some of 
these institutions, such as Servico Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial 
(SENAI), had considerable success with improving the qualifications of the 
Brazilian workforce, but such efforts have been insufficient to meet national 
demands. Although the performance of these institutions has been excellent, the 
results are modest when one considers the necessities of modern industrial 
development in Brazil. 
Worker training began with SENAI, during the first Getulio Vargas 
government. Law number 6.029, December 1942, which created SENAI, was 
concerned with industrialisation in the south-east and included the obvious 
necessity of a 'school of workers' in order to ensure that plans for future 
industrialisation would be realised. Entrepreneurial organisations, such as the 
Sao Paulo State Industry Federation (FIESP) and the CNI, were actively 
involved in the Vargas government decision. Different authors pointed out that 
SENAI was the most visible part of the emergent industrialist attitude, typical of 
the early 1940s.28 
Bearing in mind SENAI's origins as a consensus project, involving 
government and entrepreneurs, it is easy to understand the efficiency of the 
institution's performance for many years. This consensus was underpinned by a 
total integration of industrial targeting and direct administration of SENAI by 
industry organisations. The pedagogic structures of SENAI did not face 
problems until the late 1980s. Law number 6.029 had determined that every 
company had to have a 'methodical preparation of learning' and this obligation 
was fulfilled by SENAI, with industry having to pay through a 'contribution' (a 
percentage based on net company value). This is an important point: SENAI 
provided exactly what the industry expected from it. The 1942 law asked for a 
'complement' to the adult worker's professional training beyond that received 
26 Figures from Centro Profissional do Sindicato dos Bancarios do Estado de S3o Paulo, 
'Programa de Qualifica^o', 1997. 
27 Careful research by IPEA showed that the Brazilian educational system had a much lower 
performance than other countries with the same GNP. The Brazilian workforce institution 
qualification did not requalify unemployed people, as their efforts have almost exclusively been 
addressed at those who are already employed, with a few specific exceptions. Amadeo, E., 
Camargo, J., Barros, R., Urani, A., Mendonga, R., Pero, V. (1995) in Ajuste Estrutural e 
Flexibilidade do Mercado de Trabalho no Brasil - Perspectivas da Economia Brasileira (Rio de 
Janeiro: IPEA). 
28 Figures from O Giz e a Graxa (S3o Paulo: SENAI, 1992). 
in the workplace. SENAI carried out this objective efficiently from the 1940s 
until the 1980s. 
SENAI's efficiency has been confirmed by different data. According to 
Ministry of Labour data collected over 50 years and completed in 1992, SENAI 
had trained almost 70 per cent of the Brazilian work force. According to 1996 
SEADE figures, SENAI had trained 91.1 per cent of the economically active 
population in Sao Paulo.29 While Brazil had a protected industry with rigorously 
closed economic frontiers, the SENAI training methods had been both sufficient 
and efficient. The pedagogic process based on 'watch, imitate and learn' 
guaranteed success for four decades. During these decades the method was 
improved, but had never been replaced, due to pressure from the industrial 
sector. Even in the 1970s, when SENAI had attempted a planned modernisation 
of the educational process (using educational television, for example), the 
industrial organisations did not offer an alternative. 
In the late 1980s, when specific sectors started to demand highly skilled 
workers, the SENAI approach proved inadequate. The electronic and computer 
sectors required a workforce with more technological capability. SENAI still 
used traditional methods to train the 'modern technological slice' of the 
Brazilian industrial workforce. New demands were met using old techniques 
and the system began to break down. 
SENAI continued to train the same number of workers, as demanded by law, 
regardless of the state of the economic cycle. When employment shifted due to 
changing realities, the traditional scheme established by the 1942 Law exhibited 
weaknesses. Controlled by numbers set out in the law, technological training 
did not expand with the necessary speed to involve more and more components 
of the workforce. Even within specific segments, this expanded qualification 
has been curbed. The case of the electronics sector provides the best example. 
The electronics sector has continuously had unfilled positions due to a lack of 
skilled candidates to fill them.30 SENAI as a training institution cannot take the 
sole 'blame' for this discrepancy. The industrial sector has not applied any 
pressure that would lead to modernisation of worker training. Only when 
international competition arrived in the early 1990s was the huge discrepancy 
between the skill levels of workers and international standards finally 
recognised. The five decades during which occupational training was treated as 
a question of law resulted in serious damage to the prospects of the Brazilian 
industrial sector. 
However, other 'alternative routes' in occupational training have been taken 
in Brazil. Volkswagen Company, Brazil's principal car manufacturer, 
developed the most significant examples of 'alternative' training methods. In 
the late 1980s, obliged under the pressure of the changing productive structure 
29 Figures from Pesquisa de Emprego e Desemprego (S3o Paulo: SEADE, 1996). 
30 Figures from Secretaria de Emprego e R e l a t e s do Trabalho do Estado de S3o Paulo, Planilha 
de Atendimento (Sao Paulo, 1997). 
in the international car-manufacturing sector, Volkswagen researched the real 
educational profile of its workforce in Brazil. In February 1990 the results were 
divulged: 63 per cent of the Volkswagen workers (the notorious Brazilian 
'aristocracy' of industrial workers) had not completed basic schooling. More 
seriously, 54 per cent of these workers had only completed four years of basic 
schooling. The illiteracy rate among Volkswagen workers was not divulged. 
Facing the huge challenges of competition in the international market with 
this workforce profile, the Brazilian car manufacturers invested in a four-year 
training programme comprising professional training and formal education 
(basic and secondary levels). In 1994 Volkswagen reduced its workforce from 
50,000 to 36,000 and the per-hour productivity increased by 35 per cent. All of 
the dismissals were carried out with the knowledge of the local union, which 
recognised the difficulty of workers' adaptability to new production demands.31 
The local union involved in the Volkswagen case was forward thinking and 
recognised the need to address the reality of the changing structural process. 
The educational profile of the Brazilian workforce demonstrated a significant 
incompatibility with the new demands of industrial restructuring. A special 
research team, supported by Serviso Social da Industria (SESI), compiled a 
statistical education profile of Brazilian workers: only 40 per cent had 
completed basic schooling. Of even greater concern was data showing that 34 
per cent of the Brazilian workforce with a formal job had fallen into the 
'functionally illiterate' category. This category refers to people who 'could read 
basic instructions regarding industrial operation, but had no capacity to perceive 
or understand what they had just read'.12 
During the past five years, despite this concerning educational profile, the 
Brazilian productivity rate has increased continuously. FIESP research showed, 
for example, that the Indicador de Atividade Industrial in 1997 increased by 17 
per cent. However, it also showed that jobs in the industrial sector in the state of 
Sao Paulo declined by 35 per cent. This is an important point. The Brazilian 
economy has specific features including the policy of dismissing untrainable 
workers in order to adapt to new realities, sometimes at a surprisingly rapid rate. 
The Productivity Question and Brazil's Segmented Labour 
Market 
DIEESE research, conducted in 1995 on work conditions among metalworkers 
in Guarulhos (Greater S3o Paulo), revealed that 62 per cent of these formal 
sector employees had never completed any professional course or training. Yet 
the IBGE Census showed that in 1995 Brazilian industrial productivity had 
increased 4.1 per cent, following increases of 10.3 per cent in 1994 and 12.4 per 
31 Figures from 'Treinamento em Nova Fase\ in Revista Exame, 21 Dec. 1994. 
32 Figures from Perfil do Trabalhador da Industria (S3o Paulo: SESI, 1994). 
cent in 1993. Thus, despite its unskilled workforce, Brazil appears to have 
achieved significant increases in productivity rates. However, the reality of the 
Brazilian productivity rate is more complex. 
The high productivity rate in 1993 and 1994 was closely connected to the 
open economic frontiers policy practised by Brazil since the early 1990s. A 
detailed study, published in 1995, showed that in 1992 57 per cent of Brazilian 
companies in the industrial sector worked with a technological lag in terms of 
the models available on the national market, and 60.25 per cent of companies in 
the sector had industrial equipment that was, on average, at least one 
'technological generation' behind." The internationalisation of the Brazilian 
economy put great pressure on such discrepancies. 
In practical terms, the real meaning of the average rise in productivity has 
lost significance. Facing international competition has caused different reactions 
in each economic sector. First, economic internationalisation has put different 
pressure on each sector. Indeed, the different productivity rate increases in each 
sector show the possibility of making significant profits with this 
internationalisation. For better or worse, these shifts demonstrate a fundamental 
acceptance of modernised industrial relations on the part of the employers, and 
a general acceptance of the new premises of employment on the part of the 
employees. 
This segmented performance constitutes the best indicator of Brazilian 
industrial activity for each sector. IBGE figures confirm this segmentation, as 
Table 5 shows: 
Table 5 - Productivity Variance in a Sample of Industrial Sectors 
(Percentage per year} 
General Industrial Sector -2.2 10.4 4.7 12.4 10.3 4.1 
Metalwork -6.1 12.8 16.6 15.4 -1.1 -0.9 
Electronic 5.9 10.6 -2.3 29.1 23.1 9.7 
Pulp and Paper -1.6 16.0 3.7 6.8 14.3 3.7 
Pharmaceutical -4.2 0.3 -11.8 11.5 2.7 15.2 
Food -4.7 3.4 13.4 7.9 8.8 7.1 
Drinks and Refreshments -1.1 4.2 -14.2 13.3 28.3 10.4 
Textiles -4.7 3.4 13.4 7.9 11.6 -1.9 
Source: Pesquisa Industrial Mensal 1992-96 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE). 
The metalwork sector (see Table 5) recorded a negative productivity 
performance in 1994, after two years of rapid productivity increase. The 
33 Figures from Correa, P. (1995) in 'Oferta de Qualidade e Organizag3o Industrial: o Caso da 
Industria Brasileira entre 1989 e 1992', Revista Indicadores de Qualidade e Produtividade, vol. 2, 
no. 94 (Brasilia: IPEA). 
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electronic sector made huge investments and retrained its own workforce in the 
early 1990s. It recorded an impressive productivity increase after 1992. On the 
other hand, the productivity rate is a very sensitive 'thermometer'. A good 
example of this sensitivity is the pharmaceutical sector. In the late 1980s and 
continuing into the early 1990s, when prices were controlled, the 
pharmaceutical sector recorded negative increases in productivity. In 1993, 
when the controlled price policy was phased out, the sector experienced high 
increases in its productivity. In 1994, when the same controlled policy returned, 
the productivity rate dropped again. 
The increase in productivity forces us to rethink 'conventional knowledge' 
of the Brazilian economy. A study from Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Economico e Social (BNDES) economists has confirmed that, from the early 
1990s, the larger industrial companies have been making the principal 
contribution to the productivity rate increases. This study disputed the historical 
argument regarding the importance of small companies in economic 
improvements. During the past five years the sectors with the highest 
productivity rates had production concentrated in large industrial companies.34 
The IBGE Economic Census of 1985, when the economy was still very 
closed, showed that the technological spending of Brazilian companies was very 
low, at just 0.4 per cent of the net company budget. This level of spending was 
112 times less than the amount United States companies had spent in the same 
year. In 1992 this expenditure had improved; in worker training alone, Brazilian 
companies were spending 0.4 per cent of net revenue, although this represented 
less than one per cent of the total number of hours worked per year. According 
to the same criterion, in 1992 the United States spent seven per cent, and France 
and Germany spent five per cent.35 
In 1996 the situation involving technological and training expenditure had a 
completely different profile. According to CNI research conducted in that year, 
36 per cent of Brazilian companies already spent two per cent of net revenue in 
technological investment. This research showed that 70 per cent of Brazilian 
companies had a budget plan to reach this expenditure level in technological 
investment within four years.36 
The CNI research did not release results for different sectors, although it is 
widely assumed that there has been a concentration of this kind of investment in 
well-defined activities. Other research conducted in 1992 (mentioned above), 
using different methodology involving 11 different sectors of industry, showed 
two choices. First, firms can choose different suppliers in order to change 
variables such as input prices and, secondly, firms can develop common 
34 Figures from Welmowicki, M., Duarte de Alem, A., and Motta, M. (1994) 'A Dualidade no 
Mercado de Trabalho: Quantidade ou Qualidade na Gera<?ao de Empregos', Revista do BNDES, 
vol. 1, no. 2 (Rio de Janeiro). 
35 Figures from Gazeta Mercantil, 18 Aug. 1993. 
36 Figures from Gazeta Mercantil, 27 Sept. 1997. 
programmes of research and development with potential suppliers using co-
operative strategies to develop goods and production processes. Although a 
significant percentage of Brazilian companies favoured the second option, the 
research confirmed that 52 per cent of the food industry actually practised the 
first choice. The same results were true for 47 per cent of the textile industry 
and 48 per cent of the dressmakers' industry. Obviously, 100 per cent of the 
Brazilian car manufacturers had officially developed only the first choice, while 
46 per cent of the components industry had chosen to carry out common 
programmes of research and development with different sources.37 
The sectoral differences in the productivity rate - a new feature of the 
Brazilian economy - have had close correlation with the choices made in the 
early 1990s. In reality, there have been specific segments in the same industrial 
sector which have proved to be more adapted to the new economic conditions 
of competitivity. It is these segmented sectors which have demonstrated the best 
results in the Brazilian economy. This proves to be at variance sometimes, and 
indeed almost incompatible, with the conventional economic wisdom. Research 
by the Instituto Nacional de Metrologia, Normalizacao e Qualidade Industrial 
(INMETRO) has confirmed the impressive increase in ISO 9000 quality 
certificate concessions.38 Not only has there been an increase in ISO 9000 
certificates, from 18 in 1990 to 2,144 in 1996, but these have also been 
concentrated in a number of production sectors as shown in Table 6: 
Table 6 
ISO 9000 Certificates in Brazil by Sector 
(Percentage in 1996) 
Electronics 20 
Chemicals 14 
Metalwork 13 
Machinery 9 Transport Equipment 
8 
Building Sector 7 Mineral Products 
5 
Rubber and Plastic 4 
Auto Products 4 Others 
16 
Source: Associagao Brasileira de Normas Tdcnicas / INMETRO 
INMETRO also investigated the industrial relations profile among 
companies with ISO 9000 recognition. In this sample 76 per cent of the 
37 See Correa, P. (1995) 'Oferta de Qualidade e Organiza<?ao Industrial: o Caso da Industria 
Brasileira entre 1989 e 1992', Revista Indicadores de Qualidade e Produtividade, vol. 2, no. 94 
(Brasilia: IPEA). 
38 ISO 9000 is a standard for quality control in the industrial production system, meaning that a 
specific firm has achieved the level of quality demanded at an international level. 
companies had developed retraining programmes for their own workforce; 42 
per cent had developed different formal education programmes for employees 
and 45 per cent had programmes to distribute productivity gains. This shows 
that the modernisation of Brazilian industry has not affected all companies in 
the same way, with only a relatively small number of companies adopting the 
most advanced techniques. 
Conclusions 
As with other features of the Brazilian economy, the labour market has two 
dimensions, the first originating with the law and the second being real practice. 
Brazil had virtually completed the flexibilisation of the laws that had 
traditionally protected the labour market by the early 1990s. Obviously, the free 
market exclusively defined this 'disguised flexibilisation'. This condition has 
had serious consequences. The state has almost lost control of the labour market 
situation. In reality, it is in the Brazilian state's best interest to turn a blind eye 
to issues of labour market control. The real 'solution' to the flexibility problem 
- considering the geographical and economic reality in Brazil - has arisen from 
the market, as with other industrialised countries. When roughly 50 per cent of 
the economically active population has worked without 'official connections', 
this is a logical outcome. Furthermore, within the other 50 per cent of the 
economically active population, special kinds of 'flexibility' have been 
practised, as demonstrated by the many workers accepting more work with the 
same salary. 
On the other hand, the new concept of employment, with a clear employee 
commitment to productivity and quality levels, has brought about impressive 
changes in the Brazilian labour market. The pressure to move the 
industrialisation process to inner Brazil - officially attempted without success 
for the past forty years - was slowly yet efficiently accomplished through this 
new employment concept. There has undoubtedly been pressure to produce low 
cost goods at an increased scale of output. In addition, there has also been a 
push for lower salaries. This has not been an isolated process. The privatisation 
programme has made major changes in the Brazilian labour market due to the 
transformation of huge sectors of the Brazilian economy, traditionally 
connected (with special protection) to former state companies. Privatisation will 
continue to cause unemployment, until such changes are complete. 
Trade liberalisation will bring benefits in the long term, while in the short 
term it will continue to reduce jobs. Commercial openness demands more on-
the-job training and redistribution of jobs. This will probably be the most 
difficult part of this long-term change. As companies have had a policy of very 
low investment in workforce training, this process will probably be slow. 
Furthermore, company training is a high-risk investment due to a high labour 
turnover rate in Brazil. High labour turnover rate, the principal 'thermometer' 
of low quality jobs, has long been a reality of the Brazilian economy. 
There have been many mistakes made while trying to understand the 
Brazilian economy. Certain sectors of the economy have performed very 
differently from the economy as a whole. These sectors have forged their own 
rules and developed alternative working practices. Old visions of the economy 
have clashed with the new economic reality. The person who attempts to look 
for the whole will probably see only the wood without seeing the trees. That is 
why it is essential to have a full understanding of the different sectors of the 
Brazilian economy in order to see how change and modernisation is introduced 
into the system. This paper should be seen as a step in this direction. 
